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A DEFINITE CLAIM ON CLAIM INDEFINITENESS:
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF DEFINITENESS CASES OF THE PAST
DECADE WITH A FOCUS ON THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND THE
INSOLUBLY AMBIGUOUS STANDARD

Christa J. Laser
Abstract
This empirical study of patent claim definiteness cases of the past decade makes several
novel findings including: (1) slightly more than half of final Federal Circuit definiteness cases
hold the asserted claims not indefinite; (2) the percentage of non-Federal Circuit definiteness
cases holding claims not indefinite increased approximately 60 percentage points over the tenyear period focused on in this analysis;(3) the Federal Circuit more often held chemical claims
not indefinite, but electrical claims indefinite; and (4) the Federal Circuit more often held claims
with term clarity issues not indefinite, but claims with means-plus-function issues indefinite.
These differences partially result from the Federal Circuit incorporating an evidentiary burden
into the "insolubly ambiguous" standard and inconsistently applying the "insolubly ambiguous"
standard. After describing other effects of this standard, this Article recommends that the Federal
Circuit modify, clarify, or abolish the "insolubly ambiguous" standard.
*

Article won second place in the Marcus B. Finnegan Writing Competition.
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Introduction
A patent claim must "particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter
which the applicant regards as his invention."' This definiteness requirement has two purposes:
primarily, "to provide clear warning to others as to what constitutes infringement of the patent,"
and, secondarily, "to provide a clear measure of the invention in order to facilitate determinations
of patentability." 2 This empirical study shows that recent Federal Circuit cases have limited the
doctrine of claim indefiniteness, contrary to public policy and to the intent of § 112, T 2.
Section I of this Article provides an introductory background of claim indefiniteness.
Section II of this Article reports the results of an empirical study of claim indefiniteness over a
one decade period. Part A of Section II analyzes whether the Federal Circuit and other courts
more often held claims not indefinite or indefinite. Part B further analyzes indefiniteness
decisions in the Federal Circuit by subject-area: biochemical, chemical, electrical, or general and
mechanical. Part C analyzes indefiniteness decisions in the Federal Circuit by reason for the
court's indefiniteness determination.
Section III argues that the different percentages of claims found indefinite between these
categories are due to the Federal Circuit's disparate treatment of means-plus-function issues and
term clarity issues. This Section shows that when courts find a term clarity issue, they apply the
"insolubly ambiguous" standard, which incorrectly incorporates the evidentiary burden of clear
and convincing evidence. This incorporation, while it may achieve the desired result in court,
ties the hands of the Patent and Trademark Office, requiring the Patent and Trademark Office to
apply the incorrect burden of proof in some instances. Furthermore, this Section argues that
evidentiary burdens should not be used to modify purely legal standards.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit should abolish the "insolubly ambiguous" standard or
modify it to ensure that it does not incorporate the burden of clear and convincing evidence.
Courts should instead adopt a simpler indefiniteness standard: if a party seeking to demonstrate
invalidity can show by clear and convincing evidence that the claim does not meet § 112 (by
"particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards
as his invention") then courts should invalidate the patent for indefiniteness. 3 If the Federal
Circuit does not correct this trend soon, a competitor's ability to accurately determine the metes
and bounds of current patents might deteriorate further, leading to possible unintended
infringement.
I.

Background: Policy on Claim Indefiniteness

Public policy supports a strict standard for claim indefiniteness. Precision is "essential to
warn the industry concerned of the precise scope of the monopoly asserted." For this reason,
unclear metes and bounds of patent claims undermine the very purpose of the patent system, a

135 U.S.C.

§ 112 2 (2006).

2 3 DONALD

S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 8.03 (2009).
See 35 U.S.C. § 112 2.
4 Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Refining Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944).
3
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system based upon an exchange of information for monopoly rights. 5 The Patent and Trademark
Office likewise sees the primary purpose of the definiteness requirement as to inform the public
of these metes and bounds. 6 Indeed, indefinite claims can be harmful by: (1) giving the patentee
an unreasonably large scope to the detriment of the public; (2) creating risk of uncertainty to
other inventors, who then decrease experimentation and invention; and (3) increasing litigation
after competitors incorrectly judge the scope of an indefinite patent.7
Definite claims serve an additional, "secondary" purpose: to clearly identify the invention
to enable easier application of other standards of patentability such as nonobviousness and
novelty.8 Such clarity helps both examiners during the application stage 9 and courts that must
make validity determinations during subsequent litigation.1 Ideally, if patent examiners demand
definiteness in claims upfront, that demand reduces litigation later."
However, courts have not extensively incorporated the public policy demand for the
clearest possible patents into the requirement of claim indefiniteness.12 Most recently, the
Federal Circuit set forth the "insolubly ambiguous" standard of claim indefiniteness in Exxon
Research and Engineering Co. v. United States.13 The court in Exxon opined, "We have not
insisted that claims be plain on their face in order to avoid condemnation for indefiniteness;
rather, what we have asked is that the claims be amenable to construction, however difficult that
task may be."1 4 The court admitted it is difficult to find a claim indefinite using such a standard,
but stated that the standard was mandated by the statutory presumption of patent validity under §
282."
Yet on other issues of validity, such as obviousness, courts do not alter the doctrine in
response to the statutory presumption of validity. 16 Instead, they simply require that a party
seeking to demonstrate invalidity do so by clear and convincing evidence.' 7 The current Federal
'See id
6 See U.S.

PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE

§ 2173 (8th ed. 2008)
[hereinafter M.P.E.P.].
7 See Athletic Alts., Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
8 3 CHISUM, supranote 2,
§ 8.03.
9 Energizer Holdings, Inc. v. International Trade Comm'n, 435 F.3d 1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
10
United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942).
" Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1255 (Fed Cir. 2008) ("We note that the patent
drafter is in the best position to resolve the ambiguity in the patent claims, and it is highly desirable that patent
examiners demand that applicants do so in appropriate circumstances so that the patent can be amended during
prosecution rather than attempting to resolve the ambiguity in litigation.").
12 See, e.g., Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1575-76 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (where a
patent on a wheelchair of a size capable of fitting in the back seat of a vehicle was held valid because the claim was
"as precise as the subject matter permits"); Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(citing Med. Instrumentation & Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB, 344 F.3d 1205, 1214 (Fed. Cir. 2003)) (stating that
the Federal Circuit "does not impose a lofty standard in its indefiniteness cases").
13 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
14

d

15 Id. ("By

finding claims indefinite only if reasonable efforts at claim construction prove futile, we accord respect to
the statutory presumption of patent validity."); 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
16 See Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 993-94 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing AK Steel
Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 1238-39 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
17

id.
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Circuit doctrine on indefiniteness requires a far more rigorous test than that of nonobviousness: a
party seeking to demonstrate invalidity must demonstrate that the claims are "insolubly
ambiguous, and no narrowing construction can properly be adopted."' 8
Because the policy arguments seem to differ from the current standard set forth by the
Federal Circuit, one might hope that the Supreme Court would grant certiorari in a claim
indefiniteness case. However, in the last fifty years, the Supreme Court has only once
tangentially addressed claim indefiniteness, in the case of Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd.19 The Court noted that claim indefiniteness policy requires a balance
between clarity and flexibility. 2 0 In support of clarity, the Court noted:
The [patent] monopoly is a property right; and like any property right, its
boundaries should be clear. This clarity is essential to promote progress, because
it enables efficient investment in innovation. A patent holder should know what
he owns, and the public should know what he does not. For this reason, the
patent laws require inventors to describe their work in "full, clear, concise, and
exact terms," 35 U.S.C. § 112, as part of the delicate balance the law attempts to
maintain between inventors, who rely on the promise of the law to bring the
invention forth, and the public, which should be encouraged to pursue
innovations, creations, and new ideas beyond the inventor's exclusive rights.21
However, the Court also noted that patent claims are necessarily imprecise because an invention
is a "tangible" thing, with its verbal description merely an "afterthought written to satisfy the
requirements of patent law." 22 As the Festo Court explained, "[t]hings are not made for the sake
of words, but words for things." 23
The courts must weigh these competing interests. On one hand, if competitors are
uncertain about a patent's breadth, they may be deterred from engaging in legitimate activities
outside its limits, or they may invest by mistake in competing products that are within the
patent's scope. In addition, competitors may engage in wasteful litigation that a stricter rule
might prevent. 24 On the other hand, the Court acknowledged that this lack of clarity is a
necessary evil of ensuring incentives for innovation, and literalism leaves the patent unsecured
from copiers who seek to exploit the limits of language. 25

1s

Exxon, 265 F.3d at 1375.
535 U.S. 722 (2002). See 3 CHISUM, supra note 2,

§ 8.03. Before Festo, the last case on claim indefiniteness was
United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 55 USPQ 381 (1942)). This case was about the doctrine
of equivalents, and thus the U.S.P.Q. did not index it under 115.1109, but the same policy espoused by the Court
applies to claim indefiniteness.
20 Festo, 535 U.S.
at 722.
21 Id. at 730-31.
22 Id. at 731.
23 Id. (quoting Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States 384 F.2d
391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967)).
24 Id. at 732.
25 Id. at 732 (citing Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 15 How. 330, 343, 14 L.
Ed. 717 (1854) ("The exclusive right
to the thing patented is not secured, if the public are at liberty to make substantial copies of it, varying its form or
proportions.")).
19
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II.
A.

Results

Slightly More Than HalfofFinalFederalCircuitDecisions on Claim
Indefiniteness Hold the Claim Not Indefinite26

During the period from December, 1998 to December, 2008,27 the Federal Circuit heard
forty-eight 28 cases that contained a claim indefiniteness issue. 29 . Over the same period of time,
the Federal Circuit heard a total of 1,171 cases on intellectual property issues. o Thus, claim
indefiniteness issues appeared in 3.84% of Federal Circuit intellectual property cases. 31
In those forty-eight cases, the Federal Circuit found claims definite in thirty-two cases but
indefinite in sixteen cases. In other words, 66.67% of all Federal Circuit claim indefiniteness
cases found claims definite and 33.33% of cases found claims indefinite.
Table 1 shows how many and what percentages of Federal Circuit indefiniteness cases
were held definite and indefinite each year. Figure 1 shows how the percentage of Federal
Circuit indefiniteness cases that held claims definite decreased slightly from 1998 to 2008.32
"Definite" will be used in text, graphs, and tables to mean "not indefinite." This alteration is designed to make the
data easier to understand for readers not familiar with patent law's technically correct double negatives and to make
tables fit more easily onto the page.
27 The time period was measured from volume 49 to volume 88 of the second
edition of U.S.P.Q. (BNA), inclusive.
Volume 49 contains some cases from late December 1998, while volume 88 excludes some cases from late
December 2008.
28 One case, SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004), is excluded from all of
this Article's data; due to procedural issues, including a rehearing en banc, its inclusion would have caused data
from the same situation to be counted twice. Also note that the data labeled as "all Federal Circuit indefiniteness
cases" or any data not otherwise noted includes cases of all procedural types, including reversals of summary
judgment, which operate by a different standard than, for example, reversal of the district court's judgment of
indefiniteness.
29 Cases that contained a claim indefiniteness issue, for the purposes of this paper, are those indexed in the U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) under 115.1109, "claim indefiniteness." The following data only account for the particular claim of the
particular patent with definiteness issues. Some cases were remanded for issues with other patents or other claims
discussed in the case. While some cases contained multiple claims with definiteness issues, in the particular cases in
this study, the court either held all claims with definiteness issues definite or all such claims indefinite, typically
because the contested language appeared in all such claims. Therefore, it was unnecessary to separate data according
to total number of claims held definite or indefinite, although such an inquiry might produce valuable insights.
30 This is the number of Federal Circuit cases reported under volumes 49 to 88, inclusive, of the U.S.P.Q.
31 A valuable inquiry might ask how many Federal Circuit intellectual property cases were patent cases in order to
determine what percentage of Federal Circuit patent cases contained a claim indefiniteness issue.
32 Where y=mx+b, m is the slope of the trendline. A negative slope indicates a decrease
and the more negative, the
more severe the decrease. Here, the slope is -0.0225, or, in other words, each year the percentage of Federal Circuit
indefiniteness cases that held claims definite decreased by 2.25%. Over the ten year period of the study, that
percentage decreased from approximately 82% to approximately 60%. The R squared value here, however, is
0.1475, where 1.0 is a trendline that perfectly overlaps each data point. R squared values should be considered in the
context of the study, because some contexts are more predictable than others. Litigation statistics are somewhat
unpredictable, so an R squared value this low might still mean that the trendline is a relatively accurate
representation of the data points given the field. To serve the most certain value, the accuracy of the trendlines used
in this study should be considered relative to other trendlines in this study. Note that all of the graphs in this Article
exclude data points that are non-real numbers, such as those that occur when a percentage of zero cases is
determined; this adjustment allows trendlines to be plotted and does not decrease the accuracy of the data.
26
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Table 1
Federal Circuit Cases in U.S.P.Q. (BNA) on Subject of Claim Indefiniteness
(Index Number 115.1109)

Year
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
Total:

Indefiniteness
Cases 33
8
5
4
8
5
8
4
4
2
0
48

Held Definite
4
4
3
5
4
5
2
3
2
0
32

Held
Indefinite
4
1
1
3
1
3
2
1
0
0
16

% Definite
50.00%
80.00%
75.00%
62.50%
80.00%
62.50%
50.00%
75.00%
100.00%
N/A
66.67%

% Indefinite
50.00%
20.00%
25.00%
37.50%
20.00%
37.50%
50.00%
25.00%
0.00%
N/A
33.33%

Figure 1

Percentage of Federal Circuit Indefiniteness Cases
Held Definite vs. Indefinite
120.00%
-+-

% of Federal Circuit

-

Indefiniteness Cases Held
Definite
% of Federal Circuit
Indefiniteness Cases Held
Indefinite
Linear (% of Federal
Circuit Indefiniteness
Cases Held Definite)
Linear (% of Federal
Circuit Indefiniteness
Cases Held Indefinite)

100.00%
*

80.00%
60.00% 40.00%
20.00%

0.00%
1998

.........
2000

2002
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2006

2008

2010

Year

These forty-eight cases, however, include a variety of procedural scenarios; only thirtythree were final decisions on the issue of claim indefiniteness.34 For example, some cases
33 "Indefiniteness cases" in tables and charts means those cases that are indexed in 115.1109 of the U.S.P.Q. (BNA).
34 For purposes of this Article, "final" means that the Federal Circuit performed one of the following actions with

regard to the claim indefiniteness issue: affirmed a judgment of indefiniteness, affirmed a judgment of definiteness,
reversed a judgment of indefiniteness, affirmed a judgment of indefiniteness, affirmed a summary judgment of
indefiniteness, or affirmed a summary judgment of definiteness. "Final" does not include cases where, with regard to
the claim indefiniteness issue, the Federal Circuit later reheard en banc, reversed or vacated summary judgment of
indefiniteness, reversed or vacated summary judgment of definiteness, affirmed a preliminary injunction, or vacated
and remanded a judgment of definiteness or indefiniteness.

10 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 31

Copyright C 2010, Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property
reversed a lower court's grant of summary judgment and therefore might reach a different
conclusion once all of the facts are determined. Another case merely affirmed a preliminary
injunction.
In these thirty-three final cases, the Federal Circuit found claims definite in eighteen
cases but indefinite in fifteen cases. In other words, 54.55% of all final Federal Circuit claim
indefiniteness cases found claims definite and 45.45% of final cases found claims indefinite.
Table 2 shows how many and what percentages of final Federal Circuit indefiniteness
cases were held definite and indefinite each year. Figure 2 shows the percentage of final Federal
Circuit indefiniteness cases that held claims definite increased slightly from 1998 to 2008.35
Table 2
Final Federal Circuit Cases in U.S.P.Q. (BNA) on the Subject of Claim Indefiniteness
(Index Number 115.1109)
Final Federal
% of Final
Final Federal
% of Final
Final Federal
Circuit
Federal Circuit
Circuit
Federal Circuit
Circuit
Indefiniteness
Indefiniteness
Indefiniteness
Indefiniteness
Indefiniteness
Cases Held
Cases Held
Cases Held
Cases Held
Year
Cases
Definite
Definite
Indefinite
Indefinite
2008
6
2
33.33%
4
66.67%
2007
4
3
75.00%
1
25.00%
2006
3
2
66.67%
1
33.33%
2005
6
3
50.00%
3
50.00%
2004
5
4
80.00%
1
20.00%
2003
4
2
50.00%
2
50.00%
2002
3
1
33.33%
2
66.67%
2001
2
1
50.00%
1
50.00%
2000
0
0
N/A
0
N/A
1999
0
0
N/A
0
N/A
15
45.45%
18
54.55%
Total:
33

Here, the slope is positive 0.0133, or, in other words, the percentage of final Federal Circuit indefiniteness cases
that held claims definite increased from approximately 46% to approximately 59% over the period of study. The R
squared value here is 0.0341, meaning the data points varied widely from this trendline.
35
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Figure 2

Increase In Percentage of Final Federal Circuit
Indefiniteness Cases Held Definite
80.00%
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However, the percentage of non-Federal Circuit cases 36 holding claims definite increased
dramatically. As shown in Figure 3, the trendline indicates that non-Federal Circuit cases holding
claims definite increased by approximately 60 percentage-points over the ten-year period from
December 1998 to December 2008.37 Table 3 shows how many and what percentages of nonFederal Circuit indefiniteness cases were held definite, indefinite, or neither38 per year.

36

Non-Federal Circuit cases used in this study only include those published in U.S.P.Q. (BNA). U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
does not publish all lower-court decisions, as it does with all precedential Federal Circuit decisions. Therefore, the
significance of this data is not certain because not only does it not include all cases but it is not likely to be a
representative sample. The Supreme Court did not hear any cases on indefiniteness during this period. Other circuits
do not hear patent invalidity appeals. This data only includes cases from various district courts, the US Court of
Federal Claims, and the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (which hears the case before the patent is issued
and therefore does not apply the statutory presumption of validity granted only to issued patents).
37 Here, the slope is positive 0.0597, or, in other words, each year the percentage of all non-Federal Circuit
indefiniteness cases that held claims definite increased 5.97%. Over the ten year period of study, this percentage
increased from approximately 24% to approximately 84%. The R squared value here is 0.2822. As discussed in
footnote 32, a perfect R squared value is 1.0. However, R squared values should be considered in the context of the
study, because some contexts are more predictable than others. Litigation statistics are somewhat unpredictable, so
this R squared value might still mean that the trendline is a relatively accurate representation of the data points given
the field. This R squared value of 0.2822 means that, relative to other trendlines in the study, this trendline did not
vary widely from the data points, and therefore should be considered reliable.
38 "Neither" here means that the court did not make a determination on the issue of definiteness, usually because
some other issue in the case was more dispositive.
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Figure 3
Percentage of Non-Federal Circuit Opinions Published in U.S.P.Q. (BNA) Holding
Claims Definite, Indefinite, or Neither
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Table 3
Non-Federal Circuit Indefiniteness Cases Published in U.S.P.Q. (BNA)

Year
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999

Total
Non-F.C.
IP Cases
360
390
372
374
379
354
379
386
434
504

Total
Non-F.C.
Indefinite
ness Cases
0
2
2
0
3
2
4
4
6
3

Held
Definite
0
2
1
0
1
1
2
1
5
0

%Held
Definite
N/A
100.00%
50.00%
N/A
33.33%
50.00%
50.00%
25.00%
83.33%
0.00%

Held
Indefinite
0
0
0
0
2
0
1
2
0
2

% Held
Indefinite
N/A
0.00%
0.00%
N/A
66.67%
0.00%
25.00%
50.00%
0.00%
66.67%

10 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 34

Held Neither
Definite Nor
Indefinite
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1

% Held
Neither
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0.00%
50.00%
N/A
0.00%
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25.00%
16.67%
33.33%
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B.

Chemical Cases More Often ContainedClaims Held Not Indefinite; ElectricalCases
More Often ContainedClaims Held Indefinite

The forty-eight Federal Circuit decisions on claim indefiniteness covered four subjectareas 39 : biochemical, chemical, electrical, and general and mechanical. Table 4 shows how many
and what percentages of all Federal Circuit indefiniteness cases were held definite and indefinite
by subject area.
Table 4
All Federal Circuit Decisions on Indefiniteness by Subject Area from 1998-2008
Case
Held
%
Held
%
Subject Area
Total
Definite
Definite
Indefinite
Indefinite
Biochemical
1
1
100.00%
0
0.00%
Chemical
14
10
71.43%
4
28.57%
Electrical
16
10
62.50%
6
37.50%
General and Mechanical
17
11
64.71%
6
35.29%
Because non-final decisions often apply different standards than final decisions, the
following statistics on final decisions should be considered more relevant than the statistics on
non-final decisions. Table 5 shows how many and what percentages of final Federal Circuit
indefiniteness cases were held definite and indefinite by subject area. Chemical claims and
general and mechanical claims were more often held definite than indefinite, while electrical
claims were more often held indefinite than definite. The only biochemical case held the claim
definite.
Figure 4 shows these comparisons graphically. Note that prior studies have also analyzed
indefiniteness cases by subject area.40

Subject-areas used in this Article are those defined by the U.S.P.Q. (BNA) for each patent. The U.S.P.Q. also
provides sub-subject-areas, and for the cases used in this Article the subject areas included some of the following
sub-subject-areas: for biochemical--transformable cells; for chemical--antidepressants, antibiotics, immunoassays,
and heart surgery solution; for electrical-- defibrillator, internet processing of credit card transactions, voice
recognition technology, and a computer network and user interface; for general and mechanical-- air mattress, feline
surgical method, and geosteering wells.
40 John R. Allison and Mark A. Lemley, EmpiricalEvidence on the Validity ofLitigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J.
185, 194, 209, 221 (1998) (From 1989 to 1996, of 239 total Federal Circuit and District Court patent cases involving
299 patents, eight, or 5.8% of invalid patents (139 total) were held invalid on claim indefiniteness grounds. Of 23
cases with claim indefiniteness issues, eight, or 34.8% held the patent invalid Of biotech patents with claims
definiteness issues, one, or 25% was held invalid Of chemical patents with claims definiteness issues, three, or 9.4%
were held invalid. Of computer-related patents with claims definiteness issues, two, or 22.2% were held invalid. Of
electrical patents with claims definiteness issues, two, or 7.4% were held invalid Of general patents with claims
definiteness issues, three, or 3.8% were held invalid Of pharmaceutical patents with claims definiteness issues, zero
were held invalid Of software patents with claims definiteness issues, zero were held invalid) Note that the cited
article uses different standards for its empirical research and thus cannot be accurately compared to the current data.
39
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Table 5
Final Federal Circuit Decisions on Indefiniteness by Subject
Case
Held
%
Held
Subject Area
Total
Definite Definite Indefinite
Biochemical
1
1
100.00%
0
6
60.00%
4
Chemical
10
Electrical
10
4
40.00%
6
General and
Mechanical
12
7
58.33%
5

Area
%
Indefinite
0.00%
40.00%
60.00%
41.67%

Figure 4
Final Federal Circuit Decisions on Indefiniteness by
Subject Area
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The result that chemical claims and general and mechanical claims were more often held
definite than indefinite, while electrical claims were more often held indefinite than definite, may
be related to inherent differences in the nature of the subject matter. For example, chemical
inventions of a particular molecular structure can be sufficiently definitely claimed by simply
listing the proper chemical name in the claim and including the corresponding structure in the
specification.41 Electrical inventions, on the other hand, may involve user interfaces where
42

subjective terms are necessary or may involve longer, more complicated claims or means-plusfunction claims, which, as shown below, are more often held indefinite. Different judicial

treatment likely also influences these results, and is addressed in Section IV.

41
42

See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d 1306, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Datamize LLC v. Plumtree Software Inc., 417 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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C.

Claims with Means-Plus-FunctionIssues Are More Often Held Indefinite, While Claims
with Term ClarityIssues Are More Often Held Not Indefinite.

This study separates claim indefiniteness issues into three categories: (1) clerical or
semantic error; (2) means-plus-function; and (3) term clarity. 43 These categories are based on
those suggested by Chisum44 and HalliburtonEnergy Services, Inc. v. M-I L.L. C.45 The clerical
or semantic error category will be referred to in the tables and charts as "Error;" likewise, the
term clarity category will be referred to in tables and charts as "Terms." Term clarity is the
broadest category and includes terms that are not easily understood, measurements that are
unclear, and Chisum's category of "words of degree, relational terms, and ranges."
Table 6 and Table 7 show how many and what percentages of non-final and final Federal
Circuit indefiniteness cases were held definite or indefinite, and by what category. Of final
Federal Circuit decisions, claims with means-plus-function issues were slightly more often held
indefinite than not indefinite. Claims with term clarity issues were held not indefinite more than
two-thirds of the time, the most frequent of any category. Figure 5 shows these comparisons
graphically.
Table 6
All Federal Circuit Decisions on Indefiniteness by Reason
All F.C.
Held
%
Held
%
Reason
Cases
Definite
Definite
Indefinite
Indefinite
Error
6
2
33.33%
4
66.67%
Means-plusfunction
16
9
56.25%
7
43.75%
Terms
28
23
82.14%
5
17.86%
Table 7
Final Federal Circuit Decisions on
Final
F.C.
Held
Reason
Cases
Definite
Error
6
2
Means-plus-function
11
5
Terms
16
11

Indefiniteness by Reason
%
Definite
33.33%
45.45%
68.75%

Held
Indefinite
4
6
5

%
Indefinite
66.67%
54.55%
31.25%

Some cases in the non-final decisions data fell into both means-plus-function and terms categories because
multiple claims had indefiniteness issues for different reasons.
44 3 CHISUM, supra note 2, § 8.03.
45 514 F.3d 1244, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
43
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Figure 5
Final Federal Circuit Decisions on Indefiniteness by
Reason
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III.
A.

Terms

Discussion

The "Insolubly Ambiguous" StandardIncorporatesthe Burden of Clear and Convincing
Evidence

Section 112 requires that claims "particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject
matter which the applicant regards as his invention."46 However, § 282 gives issued patents a
presumption of validity.4 7 Therefore, courts must consider both the requirement that claims be
clear to be valid and the presumption of validity.
The Federal Circuit in Exxon Research and EngineeringCo. v. UnitedStates set forth the
"insolubly ambiguous" standard for indefiniteness. 4 8 This standard incorporates the statutory
presumption of validity. 49 The likely reason that the Exxon court joined the two standards is that
it is easier, faster, and more concise for a court to apply the "insolubly ambiguous" standard than
it would be for the court to explicitly apply both § 112's requirement for clarity and § 282's
presumption of validity.5 0 However, as shown infra, problems arise when courts do not clearly
delineate the legal standard from the presumption of validity.

35 U.S.C.

§ 112.
35 U.S.C § 282.
48 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed.
Cir. 2001).
49
A. Meaghin Burke, Comment, New Approaches to PharmaceuticalPatentLaw: Why CurrentPatent
Jurisprudenceis Inappropriateas Applied to the Unique Characteristicsof Chemical Compounds, 75 Miss. L.J.
1143, 1150 n.38 (2006).
50
See generally, 35 U.S.C. §§ 112, 282.
46

47
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The Exxon court's opinion provides ample evidence that the "insolubly ambiguous"
standard incorporates the presumption of validity. The Exxon court stated the following when
formulating the "insolubly ambiguous" standard: "By finding claims indefinite only if reasonable
efforts at claim construction prove futile, we accord respect to the statutory presumption of
patent validity and we protect the inventive contribution of patentees, even when the drafting of
their patents has been less than ideal." 5 Note that the indefiniteness issue in Exxon was in the
term clarity category. 52 Because courts often apply those rules that other courts developed in
cases with similar fact patterns, courts more often apply Exxon's "insolubly ambiguous" standard
to cases where the indefiniteness issue is in the term clarity category. 53
B.

Means-Plus-FunctionClaims Are More Often Held Indefinite Because the Federal
CircuitDoes Not Apply the "InsolublyAmbiguous" Standardto Them

One significant problem that arises when courts do not clearly differentiate the legal
standard of claim indefiniteness from the statutory presumption of validity is that later courts do
not seem to remain aware of the parts that make up the hybrid "insolubly ambiguous" standard.
Sometimes, when a court does not recognize that the "insolubly ambiguous" standard already
incorporates the presumption of validity, it applies a double burden on those seeking to
invalidate the patent on grounds of claim indefiniteness. 54 In other words, some courts will
incorrectly require that the party challenging the patent must overcome the presumption of
validity by presenting clear and convincing evidence that the claim is "insolubly ambiguous." 55
If this double-burden theory is correct, courts that apply the "insolubly ambiguous"
standard would be less likely to find claims indefinite than courts that do not apply the "insolubly
ambiguous" standard. Not surprisingly, this is precisely the result that this empirical study
demonstrates. As shown supra in Section III C, claims with indefiniteness issues in the meansplus-function category are more often held indefinite than definite. On the other hand, claims
with indefiniteness issues in the term clarity category were more often held definite than
indefinite.
This result is significant because the Federal Circuit applies the "insolubly ambiguous"
standard to claims with indefiniteness issues in the term clarity category. But on the other hand,
the court never applies the "insolubly ambiguous" standard to claims with indefiniteness issues
Exxon Research and Eng'g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
d
In the current study, the words "insolubly," "insoluble," and other variants were found regularly in term clarity
cases.
54 See, e.g, Tech. Patents LLC v. Deutsche Telekom AG, No. 07-3012, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88534, at *78-79 (D.
Md. Aug. 25, 2010) ("[T]here must be clear and convincing evidence that some insoluble ambiguity exists.");
ACQIS LLC v. Appro Int'l, Inc., No. 09-148, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77548, at *28 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2010)
("Defendants have not shown by clear and convincing evidence that the terms ... are insolubly ambiguous.");
Media Queue, LLC v. Netflix, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2009) ("[D]efendants have not provided
clear and convincing evidence that the claim terms are insolubly ambiguous."); VDP Patent, LLC v. Welch Allyn
Holdings, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 414, 429-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("They have failed to demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that the language of the claim is insolubly ambiguous, and their motion must fail.").
55
id.
5

52
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in the means-plus-function category. None of the cases in this study designated as mean-plusfunction cases ever mention the term "insoluble," "insolubly," or any other derivative of the
word. Some means-plus-function cases do not even mention the presumption of validity or the
burden of clear and convincing evidence. 56 But those cases that do mention the burden of proof
differentiate the burden of proof from the legal standard, saying, for example, "[A] challenge to a
claim containing a means-plus-function limitation as lacking structural support requires a
finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the specification lacks disclosure of structure
sufficient to be understood by one skilled in the art as being adequate to perform the recited

function." 57
One possible explanation for why means-plus-function cases are more often held not
indefinite is precisely because courts do not always mention the presumption of validity.
However, particularly in means-plus-function cases, courts may not mention the presumption of
validity or the burden of clear and convincing evidence. Rather, the patent itself may provide the
quantum of evidence that is necessary to invalidate the patent for indefiniteness-for example, a
means that lacks a corresponding structure.
In mean-plus-function cases, a claim is definite only if the claimed function corresponds
to a structure that performs the claimed function and the specification clearly associates the two,
from the perspective of a person having ordinary skill in the art. But if the specification
discloses no corresponding structure at all, then the claim containing the function can be held
indefinite without additional external evidence. 59 This is because for means-plus-function claims,
a lack of a structure is all that is required to show indefiniteness, so a patent without a structure
would, itself, provide the quantum of evidence necessary to meet the burden of clear and
convincing evidence (here, evidence of a lack of a structure).6 0
Nonetheless, the reason that means-plus-function cases more often hold claims indefinite
is that in means-plus-function cases the courts do not alter the legal standard of claim
indefiniteness to incorporate the presumption of validity. Instead, means-plus-function cases
define the standard for indefiniteness using language similar to the standard proposed by this
Article: if a party seeking to demonstrate invalidity can show by clear and convincing evidence
that the claim does not meet § 112 (by "particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the
subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention") 61 then courts should invalidate the
patent for indefiniteness.
In cases where the indefiniteness issue is in the term clarity category, however, the court
applies the "insolubly ambiguous" standard nearly every time, particularly in the more recent
cases. 62 And some term clarity cases apply the "insolubly ambiguous" standard and, separately,

56

58
59

60

See, e.g., Aristocrat Technologies Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int'l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328(Fed. Cir. 2008).
Intellectual Prop. Dev., Inc. v. UA-Columbia Cablevision of Westchester Inc., 336 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Cardiac Pacemakers Inc. v. St. Jude Med. Inc., 296 F.3d 1106 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
id

id.

61 35

U.S.C. § 112.
62 See e.g., Praxair Inc. v. ATMI Inc., 543 F.3d 1306, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Star Scientific Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v. Texas Instruments Inc.,

10 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 40

Copyright C 2010, Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property
the burden of clear and convincing evidence, thereby explicitly imposing a double burden on the
party seeking to invalidate the patent. 63 Even though most cases do not apply the double burden
explicitly, the empirical evidence, while not conclusive on this issue, tends to suggest that courts
either apply the double burden implicitly whenever they apply the "insolubly ambiguous"
standard or at least that the "insolubly ambiguous" standard is a higher standard of indefiniteness
than other standards of indefiniteness. 64
C.
Incorporatingthe Burden of Clear and Convincing Evidence Is Inappropriatein Cases
Where That Burden Does Not Apply, such as Patent and Trademark Office Proceedings,and Is
Contrary to the Law ofEvidence
As shown supra, the Federal Circuit modified a legal standard of indefiniteness by
incorporating the presumption of validity of issued patents. This is problematic for two reasons:
(1) evidentiary burdens should not apply to the law, but rather courts should use them to
determine what quantum of factual evidence is necessary to prove facts to which the court can
then apply the appropriate legal standard; and (2) when the Federal Circuit incorporates the
presumption of validity into the legal standard of claim indefiniteness, the Patent and Trademark
Office gives unissued patent applications a presumption of validity.
Claim indefiniteness under § 112 is a question of law. 65 The statutory presumption of
validity imposes an evidentiary burden of clear and convincing evidence upon the party
challenging the issued patent.66 In other words, only the facts supporting a finding of invalidity
should be proven with clear and convincing evidence; 67 neither the burden of clear and
convincing evidence nor the presumption of validity (embodied by the burden) ought to affect
the application of the legal standard. An evidentiary burden is separate from a legal standard; it
"exists only in connection with an issue of fact." 68 Therefore, the Federal Circuit acts contrary to
established laws of evidence by incorporating an evidentiary burden into a legal standard.

86 U.S.P.Q.2d 1225, 1229-31 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1249
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
63 See e.g., Halliburton,514
F.3d at 1249.
64 One alternative explanation for the results is simply that term clarity issues
tend not to seriously detract from the
ability of a person of skill in the art to understand the meaning of the patent compared to means-plus-function issues
or clerical or semantic errors. However, the language that courts use provides evidence that it is the standard of law,
rather than the type of claims, that generates the disparate results. Note, for example, language such as: "'Ifthe
meaning of the claim is discernible, even though the task may be formidable and the conclusion may be one over
which reasonable persons will disagree, we have held the claim sufficiently clear to avoid invalidity on
indefiniteness grounds."' Praxair Inc. v. ATMI Inc., 543 F.3d 1306, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Exxon Research
and Eng'g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
65 Net MoneylN, Inc. v. Verisign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
66 lovate Health Sciences, Inc. v. Bio-Engineered Supplements & Nutrition,
Inc., 586 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
2009) ("Patents enjoy a presumption of validity, 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006), and a party seeking to invalidate a patent
must overcome this presumption by facts supported by clear and convincing evidence.") (citing Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed.Cir.2001)).
67 Intellectual Prop. Dev., Inc. v. UA-Columbia Cablevision of Westchester
Inc., 336 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
68 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 191 (2009) (citing Walling v. Cal. Conserving Co., 74 F. Supp. 182 (N.D. Cal. 1945), affd,
167 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1948)).
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Furthermore, § 282 grants the statutory presumption of validity only to issued patents. 69
Because the Patent and Trademark Office considers only patents which have not yet been issued,
the Patent and Trademark Office should not apply § 282's presumption of validity. Nonetheless,
the guidelines for patent examiners note that a claim is indefinite only if it is "insolubly
ambiguous." 70 The Patent and Trademark Office therefore gives patent applications a
presumption of validity whenever it applies the "insolubly ambiguous" standard because, as
shown supra, the "insolubly ambiguous" standard incorporates § 282's presumption of validity.
In other words, by using the "insolubly ambiguous" standard, the Patent and Trademark Office is
granting patents even when the claims are less clear than what § 112 requires, namely that claims
"particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter which the applicant regards as
his invention." 7 1 Even assuming, arguendo, that the "insolubly ambiguous" standard yields the
correct result when the evidentiary burden is one of clear and convincing evidence, when an
evidentiary burden other than "clear and convincing evidence" is required, as in Patent and
Trademark Office proceedings, the "insolubly ambiguous" standard differs from the statutorily
mandated standard under § 112.
D.
The Patentand Trademark Office Cannot Solve the Problem Locally Because Applying a
Different Standardthan "InsolublyAmbiguous" Would Be Improper Substantive Rulemaking
The Patent and Trademark Office should not give patent applications a presumption of
validity.72 However, the Patent and Trademark Office may only follow the laws of courts as they
are presented because the Patent and Trademark Office lacks the explicit grant from Congress
that is necessary to permit it to engage in substantive rulemaking. 73 Therefore, if the courts hold
that a patent is not invalid for indefiniteness unless it is "insolubly ambiguous," the Patent and
Trademark Office must also hold that a patent is not invalid for indefiniteness unless it is
"insolubly ambiguous." Thus, the Federal Circuit, by setting forth a legal standard for
indefiniteness that incorporates the presumption of validity, essentially forces the Patent and
Trademark Office to apply an incorrect standard to patent applications.
E.

The FederalCircuit Should Abolish the "InsolublyAmbiguous" Standardor Modi yIt to
a Lower StandardThat Does Not Reflect the Burden of Clear and ConvincingEvidence

There are three possible solutions. First, the Patent and Trademark Office could recognize
that the insolubly ambiguous standard was set forth only in light of the burden of clear and
convincing evidence, ignore it, and choose to apply only legal standards that do not incorporate
an evidentiary burden. This, however, might be seen as substantive rulemaking. Second,
Congress or the Supreme Court could step in to abolish or modify the "insolubly ambiguous"

69

35 U.S.C

70

M.P.E.P.

§ 282.

§ 2173.02.
35 U.S.C. § 112 2.
72 See 35 U.S.C.
§ 282.
Merck & Co., Inc. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("[T]he broadest of the PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE's rulemaking powers-35 U.S.C. § 6(a)-authorizes the Commissioner to promulgate
regulations directed only to 'the conduct of proceedings in the [PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE]'; it does
NOT grant the Commissioner the authority to issue substantive rules") (quoting Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg,
932 F.2d 920, 930 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
7'
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standard. This result is unlikely, particularly because the Supreme Court has not heard an
indefiniteness case for over half a century. 74
Instead, the Federal Circuit should abolish or modify the insolubly ambiguous standard.
The Federal Circuit should do this by simply no longer incorporating the presumption of validity
and thus the burden of clear and convincing evidence into the legal standard of indefiniteness.
There are situations when the standard of proof should differ despite the need to apply the same
law. The difference between the standards of proof before the Patent and Trademark Office and
before the Federal Circuit is the prime example.
While the Federal Circuit could simply clarify that the "insolubly ambiguous" standard
should not apply in Patent and Trademark Office proceedings and that courts should not apply a
clear and convincing evidence standard when utilizing the "insolubly ambiguous" standard, such
a clarification would also not be ideal. Such an approach defeats the original purpose of the
"insolubly ambiguous" standard because it is more complicated than separate applications under
§§ 112 and 282. Furthermore, telling the Patent and Trademark Office and lower courts only
which burden does not apply provides insufficient guidance for what burden does apply; if the
party seeking to invalidate a patent need not provide clear and convincing evidence of its factual
assertions concerning indefiniteness, what burden should apply? Therefore, the Federal Circuit
should simply abolish the standard or modify it to not include an evidentiary burden.
Conclusion
This Article's empirical data show that, of final Federal Circuit decisions and of all lower
court decisions published in U.S.P.Q. (BNA), the percentage of cases holding claims definite
increased over the ten-year period of study. Using data from final Federal Circuit decisions,
electrical patents, which often contain more subjective descriptions than chemical patents or
which often use means-plus-function claims, are more often held indefinite than patents in any
other subject area. Additionally, in final Federal Circuit decisions, means-plus-function claims
are most often held indefinite, while claims with a term clarity issue are most often held definite.
This different percentages of claims found indefinite between these two categories is due
to the court's differential treatment of means-plus-function issues and term clarity issues. When
courts confront a term clarity issue, they apply the "insolubly ambiguous" standard, which
incorrectly incorporates the evidentiary burden of clear and convincing evidence. This
incorporation, while it may achieve the desired result in court, has negative effects elsewhere.
Most significantly, this hybrid standard ties the hands of the Patent and Trademark Office,
requiring the Patent and Trademark Office to apply the incorrect burden of proof in some
instances. This effect demonstrates why evidentiary burdens should not be used to modify
purely legal standards. In conclusion, the Federal Circuit should abolish, modify, or clarify the
"insolubly ambiguous" standard to ensure that the burden of clear and convincing evidence is not
incorporated into a legal standard but that the policy behind indefiniteness is.

See 3 CHISUM, supra note 2, § 8.03 (noting that the most recent Supreme Court case on directly on claim
indefiniteness was United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228 (1942)).
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